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1.

INTRODUCTION

The present action was brought after Plaintiff ParkWest Homes LLC
("ParkWest") was stiffed for much of the contract price Defendant Julie G. Barnson ("Barnson")
promised to pay ParkWest for constructing a single-family residence. Although a final judgment
had previously been entered in ParkWest's favor against Bamson, the district court granted the
nominee for her mortgage lender, Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
("MERS"), summary judgment voiding ParkWest's lien in the residence it built and eliminating
all possibility of recovery by ParkWest. Moreover, all but one of the legal issues adopted in
support of the judgment here challenged were raised sua sponte by the district court when
issuing its memorandum decision and were neither discussed in the briefing by the parties nor
argued on the hearing of MERS' motion.
For the reasons discussed below, the judgment in MERS' favor should be
reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings and trial.
11.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
On November 28,2006, ParkWest filed with the Canyon County Recorder a

Claim of Lien in the amount of $189,117.99 and then mailed to Barnson by certified mail a copy
of the recorded document. Clerk's Record ("R"),p. 97 at fi 8. Following the commencement of
this action, Bamson consented to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") in the
district court and the entry of default judgment in ParkWest's favor against her, provided no
award for damages was taken against her personally. R, p. 107. Based on this stipulation, the

SAC was filed in the district court, and the district court then entered a final judgment against
Barnson to the extent of her interest in the liened property, but notpevsonally, for the amounts
pleaded in the SAC (the "Barnson Judgment"). R, pp. 106-08. The Barnson Judgment was
neither appealed nor otherwise challenged in the proceedings before the district court.
Nevertheless, in granting MERS' motion for summary judgment, the district court
held (i) that ParkWest's Claim of Lien failed to substantially comply with the requirements of
Idaho Code Sections 45-507(3)(a) and 45-507(4), R, pp. 125-26; (ii) that the contract on which
the Barnson Judgment was based is void, R, pp. 130-31; and (iii) that, although ParkWest should
"at the very least" have been entitled to recover for unjust enrichment, the issue of unjust
enrichment was not before the district court, R, p. 131. ParkWest contends that the district court
erred in all of its foregoing rulings.
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.
ParkWest filed its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien on August 7,2007, and,

as a matter of course, filed its First Amended Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien on
September 12,2007. R, p. I. However, following the bankruptcy filing of Barnson, all
proceedings were stayed by order entered February 27,2008, through September 4,2008, when
ParkWest filed a motion for leave to file its SAC shortly after the dismissal of the Barnson
bankruptcy proceedings. Id. The SAC was thereafter filed on October 6,2008, pursuant to order
of the district court. R, p. 2. No answer was ever filed in this action by either Barnson or
MERS.

On September 29,2008, ParkWest filed a stipulation with counsel for Barnson
consenting to the filing of the SAC and the entry of default judgment in ParkWest's favor against
Barnson, provided no award for damages was taken against her personally. R, pp. 2 and 107. In
accordance with the terms of the stipulation, the district court entered final judgment against
Barnson in ParkWest's favor on October 7,2008, for the total amount of $174,208.39. R, pp. 2
and 106-08.
MERS' motion for s

nt filed October 2,2008, was argued to the

district court on November 24,2008, and, on January 6, 2009, the district court entered its
Memorandum Decision on Defendant Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Decision"). R, pp. 115-33. Judgment in favor of MERS was thereafter filed on
January 26,2009. R, pp. 134-36. In accordance with I.A.R. 14(a), ParkWest timely filed its
Notice of Appeal with respect to MERS' judgment on March 9,2009. R, pp. 137-40.
C.

Statement of the Facts.
On or about March 15,2006, Barnson and ParkWest entered into a contract (the

"Contract") for ParkWest's construction of a two-story residence for Barnson on a lot located in
Canyon County, Idaho (the "Property"), for the sum of $450,000. R, p. 96 (SAC ?If/ 2 and 6).
Although ParkWest was not registered as a contractor by the State of Idaho when the Contract
was executed, ParkWest (i) obtained its registration on May 2, 2006, (ii) obtained a building
permit to construct the improvements to the Property on May 18,2006, and (iii) performed its
first work in constructing the improvements to the Property on May 22,2006. R, p. 112
(Affidavit of David Zawadzki ("Zawadzki Aff.")

5/ 3). Moreover, during the course of

construction, Bamson requested that numerous upgrades and changes in the scope and the cost of
the work be performed, which ParkWest undertook to do based on the assurances of Bamson that
she would pay for such upgrades and additional work. R, pp. 96-97 (SAC 7 6). No
compensation is being sought in this action by ParkWest for any work or other acts performed in
connection with either the construction of the improvements to the Property or the performance
of the Contract which were undertaken prior to ParkWest's registration as a contractor on May 2,
2006. R, p. 112 (Zawadzki Aff. 14).
Based on Barnson's failure to pay ParkWest for the work it performed in
constructing her residence, ParkWest filed with the Canyon County Recorder on November 28,
2006, its Claim of Lien. R, p. 97 (SAC 7 8). Those portions of the Claim of Lien relevant to the
issues on appeal are set forth and signaled on the following page.
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R, pp. 103-04 (SAC Ex. B) (signals added).

Finally, after stipulating to both the filing of the SAC and the entry of a default
judgment against her, the district court entered a final judgment against Barnson to the extent of
her interest in the Property, but not personally, for the amounts pleaded in the SAC. R, p. 107.
111.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the district court err in ruling that ParkWest's Claim of Lien failed to

substantially comply with the requirements of Idaho Code Section 45-507?
B.

Did the district court err in ruling that the Contract is void?

C.

Did the district court err in ruling that the issue of unjust enrichment was

not raised by the allegations pleaded in the SAC?
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review.

All issues on appeal are subject to this court's free review. Thus, as summarized
in Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 112 P.3d 825 (2005):
Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.R.C.P. 56(c). On review this Court construes the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Hardy
v. McGill, 137 Idaho 280, 285,47 P.3d 1250, 1255 (2002). Where
there are no disputed issues of material fact, only a question of law
remains, and this Court exercises free review. Construction
Management Systems, Inc. v. Assurance Co. ofAmerica, 135 Idaho
680,682,23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001).
Nat 'I Union Fire Ins. Co., 141 Idaho at 540, 112 P.3d at 828.

B.

The District Court Erred in Ruling That ParkWest's Claim of Lien Failed to
Substantially Comply With the Requirements of Idaho Code Section 45-507.
As recently reaffirmed in BMC JK Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 174 P.3d 399

(2007): "Materialman's lien laws are construed liberally 'in favor of the person who performs
labor upon or furnishes materials to be used in the construction of a building."' [Citation
omitted.] "'To create a valid lien, there must be substantial compliance with the requirements of
the statutes."' 144 Idaho at 893-94, 174 P.3d at 402-03 (quoting Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v.
Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 850,87 P.3d 955,959 (2004) (emphasis added)). In deciding MERS'
motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled that ParkWest's Claim of Lien failed to
substantially comply with the requirements of both Idaho Code Sections 45-507(3)(a) and
45-507(4) . ' R, pp. 124-26. These two grounds for invalidating ParkWest's lien are discussed in
turn below.

' Idaho Code Sections 45-507(3) and (4)
(3)

provide, in their entirety, as follows:

The claim shall contain:

(a) A statement of his demand, afker deducting all just
credits and offsets;
(b) The name of the owner, or reputed owner, if known;

(c) The name of the personby whom he was employed or
to whom he furnished the materials; and
(d) A description of the property to be charged with the
lien, sufficient for identification.
(4) Such claim must be verified by the oath of the claimant, his
agent or attorney, to the effect that the affiant believes the same to
be just.

1.

The Claim of Lien substantially complies with the requirements of
Section 45-507(3)(a).

The district court ruled that ParkWest's Claim of Lien is invalid because Section
45-507(3)(a) requires that it contain a "statement of [ParkWest's] demand, after deducting all
just credits and offsets." R, pp. 125-26. As set forth above, however, the Claim of Lien contains
the following express statement:
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The Claim of Lien thus unequivocally contains a statement of ParkWest's demand. Moreover,
there was no allegation or affirmative defense raised by any party to this action that ParkWest's
Claim of Lien was not made "after deducting all just credits and offsets." The district court's
ruling must therefore be based on the fact that the words "after deducting all just credits and
offsets" are not included in the statement of ParkWest's demand. This purported deficiency was
raised sua sponte by the district court when it issued its Decision and was neither discussed in
either party's briefing nor addressed at the hearing on MERS' motion. Nor does the district
court cite any authority holding that the words "after deducting all just credits and offsets" must
be expressly included in a lien claimant's demand.
The fact that ParkWest's statement of its claim was made "after deducting all just
credits and offsets" is supported by the following undisputed facts:
1.

The Contract for Barnson's residence was in the amount of $450,000, and

the constructed improvements were completed on November 1,2006. R, pp. 96-97 (SAC

fill 6-71.

2.

The Claim of Lien recorded November 28,2006, was in the amount of

$189,117.99, or less than half of the Contract price. R, p. 97 (SAC 7 8).
3.

ParkWest was not provided with documentation establishing Barnson's

execution of an amendment to the Contract reducing the contract price (and lien claim) by
$28,000 until after this action was filed. R, p. 98 (SAC 1[ 10).
4.

The Barnson Judgment was in the amount of $174,208.39. R, pp. 2 and

107. Thus, after adjustment for the referenced amendment to the Contract, the amounts of the
Claim of Lien and the Bamson Judgment are consistent.
The starting point, of course, in determining what must be included in the Claim
of Lien is the language of the controlling statute. And although Section 45-507(3)(a) expressly
requires that the statement of ParkWest's demand be made "after deducting all just credits and
offsets," nowhere does the statute require that a lien claim must explicitly state that it has been
made after such deductions were effected. The recent decision in BMC W. Corp., supra, should
control the resolution of the question on appeal.
There, because "Kamachi, the agent of BMC, typed her name rather than signing
it, Horkley argue[d] that the lien was not properly verified by oath." Id., 144 Idaho at 896, 174
P.3d at 405. The court, however, rejected the argument holding as follows:
Idaho Code 5 45-507 does not state that the lien must be signed; it
only states that it must be verified by the oath of the claimant.
Because Kamachi was given an oath by a notary public, and
because a signatzlre is not explicit4 required, her typewritten
name suffices.

144 Idaho at 897, 174 P.3d at 406 (emphasis added). Accordingly, applying the foregoing
holding to the present issue, because ParkWest's statement of its claim was in fact made "after
deducting all just credits and offsets" and Section 45-507 does not explicitly require the
foregoing quoted phrase to be included in a lien claim, ParkWest's Claim of Lien substantially
complies with the requirements of the controlling statute. The district court therefore erred in
ruling that the Claim of Lien fails to substantially comply with Section 45-507(3)(a).
2.

The Claim of Lien substantially complies with the requirements of
Section 45-507(4).

In issuing the only ruling on appeal that was made with respect to a question
raised by MERS and therefore briefed and argued by the parties in the proceedings below, the
district court ruled that parkwest's Claim of Lien is invalid because "it fails to contain any
verification even 'remotely similar' to the one upheld in Treasure Valley Plumbing and
He~ting."~R, p. 126. As previously set forth, the Claim of Lien contains the following
verification:

Treasure Valley Plumbing &Heating, Inc. v. Earth Res. Co., 106 Idaho 920, 684 P.2d
322 (Ct. App. 1984).
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Or in sum, after expressly stating that the "undersigned" is "the Authorized Representative of the
claimant of the foregoing mechanic's lien;" and that he has "read said mechanic's lien and
know[s] the contents thereor' and that "the same is true of my knowledge":
1.

The Claim of Lien is executed by David Zawadzki "under penalty of

perjury that the foregoing is true and correct";

2.

Zawadzki's execution of the Claim of Lien is acknowledged by a notary

3.

Zawadzki's execution and oath are verified by a notary public using the

public; and

form specified in Idaho Code Section 51-109(2).)
As with the prior issue discussed, the starting point in determining what must be
included in the Claim of Lien is the language of the controlling statute, which specifies: "Such
claim must be ver13ed by the oath of the claimant, his agent or attorney, to the effect that the
affiant believes the same to be just." IDAHOCODE5 45-507(4) (emphasis added). Thus,
although Idaho Code Section 45-507(4) expressly requires that ParkWest's Claim of Lien be
verified by the oath of ParkWest or its agent or attorney, nowhere does the statute require that the
verification explicitly adhere to any specified form.

Idaho Code Section 51-109(2) provides, in its entirety, as follows:
(2) An oath or affirmation, which is in writing, shall be
signed by the person who takes it, and the notary public shall enter
thereunder substantially the following:
"State of Idaho
)
) ss.
Cou11ty o f . . . .
)
Subscribed and sworn (or affirmed) before me this . . . . day
of . . . . . . . . , . . . . .
. . . . . . . (official signature and seal)"
(Emphasis added.) Idaho Code Section 18-5402 defines the tenn "oath" for purposes of perjury
to include "an affirmation, and every other mode authorized by law of attesting the truth of that
which is stated." Accord State v. Parker, 81 Idaho 51,55,336 P.2d 318,320 (1959). See also
67 C.J.S. Oaths and Affirmations 5 8 (2002) he he elements of an oath include a solemn
declaration, manifestation of intent to be bound by the statement, the signature of the declarer,
and an acknowledgment by an authorized person that the oath was taken.").

Also as with the prior issue discussed, the following holding in BMC W. Corp.
should control the resolution of the question on appeal:
[Slince Kamachi, the agent of BMC, typed her name rather than
signing it, Horkley argues that the lien was not properly verified by
oath. Idaho Code 5 45-507 requires that claims of lien "be verified
by the oath of the claimant, his agent or attorney, to the effect that
the affiant believes the same to be just." Black's Law Dictionary
(8th ed.2004) defines "verification" as a 'yormal declaration
made in the presence ofan authorized ofjcer, such as a notary
public. . . . " Kamachi was "sworn upon oath" by a notary public.
Idaho Code 8 45-507 does not state that the lien must be signed; it
only states that it must be verified by the oath of the claimant.
Because Kanlachi was given an oath by a notary public, and
because a signature is not explicitly required, her typewritten name
suffices. Kamachi's verification therefore was not defective.
144 Idaho at 896-97, 174 P.3d at 405-06 (emphasis added). Accordingly, applying the foregoing
holding to the present issue, because ParkWest's Claim of Lien was verified by the oath of its
agent in a "formal declaration made in the presence of an authorized officer, such as a notary
public . . ." and Section 45-507 does not explicitly require the verification to adhere to any
specified form, Zawadzki's verification substantially complies with the requirements of the
controlling statute.
Although the district court quotes in its Decision much of the foregoing holding in
BMC K Corp., see R, p. 123, the district court provides no rationale for why the holding in that
case does not control the resolution of the present issue. Moreover, the district court's ruling that
ParkWest's Claim of Lien is invalid because "it fails to contain any verification even 'remotely
similar' to the one upheld in Treasure Valley Plumbing and Fleating" is substantively inaccurate.

In Treasure Valley Plumbing and Heating, the court of appeals held that a valid
verification existed where the certificate of the lien claimant's president recited that an oath had
been administered and the claim was believed to be true and just, and the accompanying notary
public's certificate contained "not merely a corporate acknowledgment but also a statement that
the corporation's president 'did subscribe and swear to' the lien claim before the notary." 106
Idaho at 922,684 P.2d at 324. In support of its holding "that these certificates taken together,
constitute a verification" the court of appeals explained: "A vergcation is a '[~Jonfirmationof
correctness, truth, or authenticity, by affidavit, oath, or deposition. "' Ibid (quoting BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
1400 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, ParkWest
respecthlly submits that Zawadzki's declaration made "under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct" coupled with the accompanying notary public's verification that
the declaration had been "[sligned and sworn to" by Zawadzki constitutes a "verificalion"
equally under both the definition contained in the revised fifth edition of Black's Law
Dictionary, as cited and relied upon by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Treasure ValleyPlmbdng
aizd Heating, and the definition contained in the eighth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, as
cited and relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in BMC W. Corp. The district court thus erred
in ruling that Zawadzki's verification fails to substantially comply with Section 45-507(4).
C.

The District Court Erred in Ruling That the Contract Is Void.
The district court ruled that the Contract is void, "[slince PARKWEST, by its

own admission, entered into a contract with BARNSON (thus, 'acted') before it complied with

the requirements of the [Idaho Contractor Registration] Act4 . . . ." R, p. 130. As with the first
question discussed above, this issue was raised sua sponte by the district court when it issued its
Decision and was neither discussed in either party's briefing nor addressed at the hearing on
MERS' motion. Accordingly, the district wurt did not consider ParkWest's contention that the
Contract had been ratified by Barnson after ParkWest obtained registration as a contractor by the
State of Idaho.
As explained in Corbin on Contracts:
Courts often state that a void contract cannot be ratified.
Courts apply this principle to contracts involving public policy
issues because, historically, courts viewed contracts deemed
"illegal" as void contracts. Thus, the parties could not ratify these
contracts. This is a correct rule so long as the applicable law has
not changed and the facts remain the same. I f ; however, a change
has occurred such that the bargain, ifentered into at the later time,
would be valid, a ratification at the later time may itselfconstitute
an enforceable contract. Neither the making of such a bargain nor
its performance is prohibited. All that is necessary is that the
ratifying transaction shall itself fulfill ordinary contract
requirements.
15 GRACEMCLANEGIESEL,CORBNON CONTRACTS,
Contracts Contvaly to Public Policy

3 89.14 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2003) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). Accord

17A

C.J.S. Contracts 3 287(a) (1999).
The relevant facts supporting Barnson's "subsequent" ratification of the Contract
are set forth above as follows:

1.

Although ParkWest was not registered as a contractor by the State of

Idaho when the Contract was executed, ParkWest (a) obtained its registration on May 2, 2006,
(b) obtained a building permit to construct the improvements to the Property on May 18,2006,
and (c) performed its first work in constructing the improvements to the Property on May 22,
2006.
2.

During the course of construction, Barnson requested that numerous

upgrades and changes in the scope and the cost of the work be performed, which ParkWest
undertook to do based on the assurances of Barnson that she would pay for such upgrades and
additional work.

3.

No compensation is being sought in this action by ParkWest for any work

or other acts performed in connection with either the construction of the improvements to the
Property or the performance of the Contract which were undertaken prior to ParkWest's
registration as a contractor on May 2, 2006.
4.

After Bamson stipulated to both the filing of the SAC and the entry of a

default judgment against her, the district court entered a final judgment against Bamson to the
extent of her interest in the Property, but notpersonally, for the amounts pleaded in the SAC.
Although neither of Idaho's appellate courts appears to have addressed the
question here presented, the general rules with respect to "ratification" are summarized in Corpus
Juris Secondum as follows:
Ratification of a contract may be found under a variety of
circumstances, such as intentionally accepting benefits under the
contract after discovery of facts that would warrant rescission,

remaining silent or acquiescing in the contract for a period of time
after having the opportunity to avoid it, or recognizing the validity
of the contract by acting upon it, performing under it, or
affirmatively acknowledging it.
17A C.J.S. Contracts 5 138 (1999) (footnotes omitted). CJ: Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic &
Hosp., Inc., 122 Idaho 47,55, 830 P.2d 1185, 1193 (1992) (summarizing the doctrine of implied
ratification by a principal in a contract setting). Therefore, based on the rule that the record must
be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, "drawing all
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor," Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., supra,
ParkWest submits that Barnson ratified the Contract ajku ParkWest obtained registration as a
contractor by the State of Idaho. Any other ruling would allow Bamson to avoid obligations she
assumed in connection with inducing ParkWest, which was then duly registered as a contractor,
into both making numerous upgrades and changes in the scope and the cost of the work it
performed at her request and settling its claims against Bamson-and

releasing her personally-

in exchange for her stipulation to ParkWest's lien in the Property, as pleaded in the SAC.
Accordingly, the district court erred in ruling sua sponte that the Contract is void.
D.

The District Court Erred in Ruling That the Issue of Unjust Enrichment
Was Not Raised by the Allegations Pleaded in the SAC.
In connection with ruling that the Contract is void, the district court

acknowledged that, "[alt the very least, PARKWEST should have been entitled to a recovery
based upon unjust enrichment." R, p. 131 (citing Barry v. Pac. W. Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827,
833, 103 P.3d 440,446 (2004)). "Nevertheless," as the district court went on to rule, "that issue
is not before the court." R, p. 131. The determination of whether the issue was then before the

court was also made sua sponte by the district court, with neither party raising the issue in its
briefing nor addressing it at the hearing on MERS' motion. Nor does the district court cite any
authority or include any analysis in its Decision supporting its ruling.
The pleading requirements under 1daho law are articulated in Seiniger Law Office,
P.A. v. N. Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 178 P.3d 606 (2008), as follows:
Generally, a claim for relief need contain only "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief. . . . " I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Under notice pleading, "a party is no
longer slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its
pleadings." Cookv. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857,
864 (2000) (citation omitted). A complaint need only state claims
upon which relief may be granted. Id. at 34, 13 P.3d at 865. A
party's pleadings should be liberally construed to secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case. Vendelin v. Costco
Wholesale Corp.., 140 Idaho 416,427,95 P.3d 34,45 (2004)
(citations omitted). The emphasis is to insure that a just result is
accomplished, rather than requiring strict adherence to rigid forms
of pleading. Id. "The key issue in determining the validity of a
complaint is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the
claims brought against it." Id.
145 Idaho at 246-47, 178 P.3d at 61 1-12. See also Cafferty v. State, Dept. of Transp., 144 Idaho
324, 328, 160 P.3d 763, 777 (2007) ("A complaint need only contain a concise statement of facts
constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief." (citation omitted)).
In this regard, although ParkWest specifically pleads the existence of its lien
nowhere in the SAC does ParkWest
against the Property and seeks a decree of foreclo~ure,~
specify or limit the particular legal theories on which its claim is based. Rather, in accordance

' Indeed, the SAC'S h l l title is "Second Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien."
p. 95.

R,

with the foregoing pleading requirements, ParkWest set forth the following concise statement of
facts constituting its claim:
On or about March 15,2006, Barnson, as "Owner," and
6.
ParkWest, as "Contractor," entered into a contract for ParkWest's
construction of a two-story residence (the "Residence") on the
Property for the sum of $450,000. Thereafter, Barnson requested
that numerous upgrades and changes in the scope and the cost of
the work be performed, which ParkWest undertook to do based on
the assurances of Barnson that she would pay for such upgrades
and additional work. Such requested changes, together with
Barnson's delay in making numerous decisions and selections
reasonably required for the construction work to progress, resulted
in substantial increased costs to and work by ParkWest for which it
is entitled to be paid by Barnson. Additionally, pursuant to the
terms of the parties' construction contract, Barnson agreed to pay
interest at the rate of 18% per annum on amounts not paid within
five days after request for payment was made. As a result of the
foregoing, ParkWest reasonably estimated and believed that
Barnson owed ParkWest the approximate sum of $189,117.99 as
of November 1,2006.

Based on Barnson's failure to pay ParkWest for the
8.
foregoing referenced work, upgrades, changes, delays, and interest,
ParkWest filed with the Canyon County Recorder on
November 28,2006, a Claim of Lien in the amount of $189,117.99
and mailed to Barnson by certified mail a copy of the recorded
Claim of Lien on November 30,2006. Copies of the referenced
Claim of Lien and proof of receipt are attached hereto as
Exhibit B.

Because, among other reasons, ParkWest was not provided
10.
until after this action was filed with documentation establishing
Barnson's execution of a contract amendment she had requested
reducing the contract sum to $422,000 or with the amounts paid on
ParkWest's behalf by Barnson's construction lender to
subcontractors, materialmen, or others with respect to the

Residence, ParkWest had no way of determining the actual amount
owed by Barnson to ParkWest for its construction of the Residence
prior to the time it filed its Claim of Lien. However, based on
discovery undertaken and documentation obtained by ParkWest in
the bankruptcy proceedings, Barnson owed ParkWest the sum of
$141,208.39 as of November 1,2006.
R, pp. 96-98 (SAC 77 6, 8, and lo).
Because the foregoing factual statement fully supports ParkWest's recovery under the
alternative legal theories of unjust enrichmentGor quantum meruit7 should the Contract be illegal
and void,s the district court also erred inruling sua sponte that the issue of unjust enrichment was
not raised by the allegations pleaded in the SAC. See, e.g., Seiniger Law O@ce, P.A., supra.

' See Barry, 140 Idaho at 834, 103 P.3d at 447 ("Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the
measure of recovery under a contract implied in law. A contract implied in law, or quasicontract, 'is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing
about justice and equity without reference to the intent of the agreement of the parties . . . ."'
(citations omitted)).
See Barry, 140 Idaho at 834, 103 P.3d at 447 ("quantum meruit is the appropriate
recovery under a contract implied in fact. A contract implied in fact exists where there is no
express agreement but the parties conduct evidences an agreement." (citation omitted)).
Although in Barry the plaintiff was limited in its recovery to unjust enrichment, the
policy considerations suppofting the plaintiffs recovery in that case to restitution are not here
applicable. See Barry, 140 Idaho at 833-34, 103 P.3d at 446-47. Thus, if the Contract was not
ratified by Barnson, quantum meruit should inure because (a) all of the work performed by
ParkWest was undertaken after it obtained registration as a contractor by the State of Idaho and
(b) the parties' post-registration conduct evidences their agreement.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing points and authorities, the judgment in MERS' favor
should be reversed and the matter remanded to the district court for further proceedings and trial.
DATED this 10th day of July 2009.
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